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∂27-AUG-75 0527 network site ISI
Date: 27 AUG 1975 0527-PDT
From: RUSSELL at USC-ISI
Subject: Stanford Proposal
To: JMC at SU-AI
cc: Licklider, Russell
Have received and begun review of your proposal.
Final action requires results of our 3 Sept 75 Budget
Review with the Director. Will keep you advised.
Dave Russell/hcb
∂25-AUG-75 0519 network site ISI
Date: 25 AUG 1975 0517-PDT
From: LICKLIDER at USC-ISI
Subject: Reaction to Proposal
To: McCarthy at SU-AI
cc: Licklider
Not a full reaction yet, but soon. Partially: The total
amount of funding called for is considerably greater than budgeted
for or available. Terry's section seemed not to have been made
more definite as requested. There is no willingness in ARPA Hq.
to spend so much on Formal Reasoning (on the ground that the work
aimed at understanding proofs in mathematics has small
bearing on tangible Defense problems). The reorientation of the
vision part looks very helpful. Sorry those are mainly
negative items. More later this week, hopefully more definite, less
negative.
Regards
Lick
-------
Position Paper for ARPA IPTO Meeting
in San Diego, March 1975
Control and Monitoring Systems Using Packet Technology
F. Heart, L. Sher
Computer Systems Division
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
A major advantage of packet-switching technology is that
one is able to use less communications bandwidth by more effectively
multiplexing many different users over single pieces of bandwidth.
To date, the packet-switching technology has been considered mainly
in relation to communications between people and computers, computers
and computers, and people and people. There is an entirely separate
class of possible applications which effectively uses some of the
techniques learned during the development of the ARPA Network packet-
switching technology: applications for monitoring and control.
Many large and complicated systems in both the civilian and
military sectors are built with a very large number of wires, e.g.,
automobiles, ships, airplanes, and buildings. An airplane has many
miles of wire connecting all the controls and indicators with all
the actuators and all the sensors. A ship has a similar abundance of
wires. An office building uses many wires for alarm systems,
heating systems, lighting systems, etc. Whereas such wires--on the
spool--are usually inexpensive, the related costs are not. In all
cases, wires require installation, connectors, servicing provisions,
failure-mode provisions, and documentation, any or all of which may
cost much more than the wires themselves. In aircraft, additional
related costs arise from considerations of weight, reliability,
shielding from electrical noise sources, possible retrofits and
modifications, periodic reconfiguration (e.g., passengers vs. cargo),
interchangeability of the system pieces (with those in other
aircraft types), inventory of spares, etc. All such costs are
impacted if packet technology is substituted for "multiwire", and
it would appear that the impact could be made to be favorable in
almost every case.
A multiplexing scheme using packet technology has the key
attribute that it can compress a large portion of the complexity
of a monitoring and/or control system into a set of near identical
little boxes, and such boxes have been getting smaller and cheaper
at a stunning rate. Thus, one can easily imagine a set of
standardized modules, one used at each control, indicator,
actuator, or sensor. Interconnecting these modules would be a
single communications medium, using guided or unguided electro-
magnetic or acoustic energy, e.g., a wire, a coaxial cable,
a waveguide, the skin of an airplane, the electrical power line,
the hydraulic power lines, optical fibers, etc. Sensors and
controls would launch addressed packets into the communications
medium. Indicators and actuators would listen for and acknowledge
correct receipt of any packet addressed to them. Packet routing would
probably be quite different from ARPANET protocols, and all
instruments* would probably share a common communications channel,
as in the ALOHA protocols.
←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←
*For this purpose, an instrument is any indicator, sensor, actuator,
or control.
Refinements of numerous types are possible: Sensors could
send packets at a rate suitable only for resolving changes in the
parameter sensed. (If there is no change, sensors could just send
packets periodically.) Data of low or high bandwidth, if not
needed in real time, could be time compressed or expanded as
needed in order to get into and out of the packet format. Polling
could be used in all, some, or no data transmissions. A
system could run continuously-interleaved self-diagnostics. The
communications medium could have various forms of redundancy making
it highly immune to failure. It could be optical, which would
be fully immune to electrical noise.
Adding any sending, receiving or sending/receiving element
would require a near-irreducible minimum of effort. For example,
one could easily imagine an airplane in which any of the cockpit
instruments could be plugged into any cockpit instrument location.
Except for serial vs. parallel data paths, this concept of
a packet-carrying "information bus" is not unlike the PDP-11's
Unibus, which has since been widely copied. A similar kind of
"information bus" has now been proposed by Hewlett-Packard for
industry-wide adoption, so that various instruments of different
manufacturers--and of one manufacturer--can easily be plugged
together.
Some of the interesting questions about using packet
technology for control and monitoring systems are the following:
1. What are the projected costs of the modules which
interface instruments to the packet-carrying communications medium?
2. In what kinds of applications are the costs first likely
to be acceptable?
3. Can interface modules become so standardized that one
type or a very few types could serve many users and uses?
4. In what application areas might it be reasonable to
expect this technology to transfer from the military to the
civilian sector?
We can now speculate on some of these issues.
On costs (question #1), we must make some assumptions.
First we assume a communication medium that has a useful bandwidth
of somewhere between 1Mb and 100Mb (even though for some
applications, 1Mb would be overkill). This bandwidth would
probably permit error-free intercommunications of a hundred or
so to a few thousand common kinds of instruments. An interface
module for this purpose, if built in 1975, would probably have
10 to 30 IC's and would probably cost $1000. Current trends,
however, suggest that in 5 to 10 years, one or two IC's at $10
is not unreasonable, particularly if they are not too highly
specialized. One can easily imagine this interfacing module
incorporated either in the instrument or in a connector.
On applications (question #2), one cannot avoid
spacecraft and aircraft as the most likely candidates, both having
extensive, stringent requirements and a high cost overhead per
installed wire. (But, as noted, there is a possible commonality
of parts with other monitoring and control systems, which suggests
that in more cost sensitive applications, high parts costs might
be offset by low design and development costs.) The rising
popularity of fly-by-wire techniques also bodes well for the
high damage-resistance possible in a packet-mediated control
system.
Standardization of interface modules (question #3), appears
to be limited by two primary factors, both of which may be
overcome, at least partially: (a) Different kinds of communication
media, e.g., fiber optics vs. coaxial cable, obviously require
different kinds of coupling to them. The solution here appears to
be a two-part interface module, one part which does the logic
electronically and the other part which couples energy to and from
the communications medium. (b) Applications requiring vastly
different minimum speeds of communication are easily imagined.
The solution here may be two or three different speed-families,
or possibly using a single fast family of logic modules for all
applications, slowing the bit rate (within each packet) by
suitable fast-in slow-out shift registers where necessary.
Fallout of this packet technology into civilian life
(question #4) may appear in such places as automobile traffic
control, mass transit and personal rapid transit (PRT) systems,
monitoring and control in large buildings, weather sensor arrays,
fire sensor arrays, and commercial aircraft. It is interesting
to observe that multiplexing to reduce the number of wires has
already been done in the 10-channel audio and the light switches
at each seat in a jumbo jet and has been seriously proposed and
demonstrated for automotive use by DuPont using digital multiplexing
over plastic fiber optics*.
←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←
*Design News 30 (No. 4), 34, (Feb. 17) 1975.
We suggest that now, as the needed technology is so rapidly
appearing, the use of packets for monitoring and control should be
studied. The primary issue for study is a technologic-economic mix:
What kinds of development are needed to assure early yet prudent and
economic deployment of such a capability? Other important issues
are a quantification of costs and benefits for likely areas of
application, and key technologic hurdles.
-------
∂2-APR-75 0528 network site ISI
Date: 2 APR 1975 0528-PDT
From: LICKLIDER at USC-ISI
Subject: Easter Message
To: McCarthy at SU-AI, Ernest at SU-AI, Winston at MIT-AI,
To: Newell at CMU-10A, Nilsson at SRI-AI, Amarel
cc: Licklider
The purpose of this Easter note is to bring you up to date
on a development in ARPA that concerns me greatly -- and will, I think,
also concern you. It is the continued and accelerating (as I
perceive it) tendency, on the part of the ARPA front office, to devalue
basic research and the effort to build up an advanced science/technology
base in favor of applied research and development aimed at directly
solving on an ad hoc basis some of the pressing problems of the DoD.
Let me be clear that I am strongly in favor of ARPA's contributing
maximally to the solution of pressing DoD problems. What concerns
me is that, whereas I see the main hope in the creation of new methods
and far-advanced systems based on new methods, the prevailing direction
in ARPA is to do research within the specific
contexts of military problems -- and not to do research
that does not have a military 'buyer' ready to take it over as soon as
the concept gets well formulated.
The present indications of this direct-
application-oriented trend are strong pressures form the new Director,
George Heilmeier, that IPTO 'redirect' the university AI efforts
to work on problems (vehicles) that have real DoD validity, criticisms
of the Speech Understanding and Image
Understanding programs for not being tied directly into application
projects that will be taken over and supported by the Services, strong
emphasis on Software Technology efforts that will have effects in the
short term (with strong pressure to de-emphasize longer-term research
such as that on fully automatic programming), and, in general, a
tendency to evaluate IPTO programs by asking people in the DoD offices
(which would use or preside over the use of eventual applications of
our stuff) what they think of the programs.
In the case of AI (or Intelligent Systems, IS, as the sub-
element of the IPTO program is called in local paperwork -- IS now
includes three sub-subelements: AI, Knowledge-Based Computer System
Applications, and Intelligent Terminals), the situation is complicated
by the fact that ARPA has been supporting basic research at a
rather high level for more than ten years (has spent more than
$50 million on it), and it is natural for a new director, or even an
old one, to ask, 'What have we gotten out of it in terms of improvements
in national defense?'. [Supermodern punctuation convention right
there!] Unfortunately, most people who are asked that question answer
'I don't know' or even 'nothing'. IPTO tries to establish that pushdown
lists, interactive debugging in source language, and even a
big part of time sharing came out of AI and that AI systems such as
Dendral, Mycin, and Macsyma actually do have expert-human-level
capabilities or (in some areas) better, but there is in fact a big
gulf between the perceptual sets of AI buffs and DoD administrators,
and the latter really mean, when they ask about the payoff, where are
the intelligent weapon systems? They would understand intelligent
support systems, but weapon systems dominate support systems in the
prevailing psychological space, and even the Secretary of Defense has
to work at it to get his people to realize that more is spent on
operations and maintenance than on personnel and more on personnel than
on procurement. In any event, this perceived lack of specific
payoff from $50 million is a major source of dissonance.
Needless to say, we have all been working hard to accomplish
two things:
1. To educate the new Director into a stronger appreciation
of truly advanced technology and into a realization that
the future is not to be won by making a lot of minor
technological advances and moving them immediately into the
Services. We point to time sharing and interactive computing,
systems like DENDRAL and MACSYMA, languages like LISP, the
ARPANET, highly realistic graphics with brightness
gradations, color, and kinematics, and other such exemplars
of real advances that have already been made and have had
major effects. We point to the big advances that are now in
the offing -- about which more later.
2. To improve the connections between IPTO programs and the
DoD offices that ought to know about them, appreciate them,
say good things about them, and be ready to take over and
apply their applicable outputs. There is no doubt that
IPTO is (and always has been) weak in respect of that kind of
connection with the Department of which it is a part. During
the time he was in DDR&E, George Heilmeier evidently heard
a lot of criticism of ARPA, and of IPTO in particular, from
the various DoD offices, and now he is determined to do
something about it. The fact is, we in IPTO were working
very hard to do something about it, but now we are under
strong Directoral pressure to accelerate the movement.
Many of my remarks at the recent PI Conference were related
to what I am telling you now, but I mean what I say here to be a
stronger statement of the problem and an assertion that
the problem is deeper than I then realized.
During the time since George Heilmeier arrived, we have
taken advantage of every opportunity to brief him and discuss
programs with him. He has given us a lot of time and participated
actively in the discussions. He is bright and energetic; there is
no problem about getting his attention. The problem is that the
frame of reference with which he enters the discussions is basically
quite different from the frames of reference that are
natural, comfortable, and familiar to most of us in IPTO -- and, I
think, to most of you. In my frame -- or in our frames -- it is a
fundamental axiom that computers and communications are crucially
important, that getting computers to understand natural
language and to respond to speech will have profound consequences
for the military, that the ARPANET and satellite packet communications
and ground and air radio networks are major steps forward into a new
era of command and control, that AI techniques will make it possible
to interpret satellite photographs automatically, and
that 10↑10-bit nanosec memories and 10↑12-bit microsecond memories
and 10↑15-bit millisecond memories are more desirable than gold. In
George's frame, and to a greater or lesser (I think the latter)
extent also in Alex Tachmindji's frame, none of those things is
axiomatic -- and the basic question is, who in DoD needs it and is
willing to put up some money on it now? We are trying hard to
decrease the dissonance between the frames, but we are not making
good progress. As one of my colleagues put it Friday, 'I think we are
slowly holding our own with George'.
A little over a week ago, we had our 'Apportionment Review'
in which adjustments to FY 76 funding levels were discussed. We
have not heard yet exactly what the front office's conclusions were
or will be (though we have been interactiong on the question); we
expect to have a written statement on Tuesday, along with the other
ARPA offices. My expectation is that there will be major deferrals
in all our basic research programs. But we shall
know more definitely very soon, so I'll not speculate further on that
subject. The important thing will be not so much the size of the
deferrals as whether they are defined as hedges against Congressional
fund cutting (Such deferrals are necessary because we do not yet know
what the action of the Congressional committees will be.) or as
diversions of funds from basic research (or even exploratory
development projects that do not have definite technology-transfer
routes established) into definite applications.
As I mentioned at the PI Conference, the concept of
'Silver Bullets' is important in ARPA, in George Heilmeier's view
of what ARPA should accomplish. One of his main silver-bullet areas
is underwater sound and sonar, and IPTO is in the process of 'buying
in' on the HASP Project (Ed Feigenbaum's AI approach). Another is
maintenance of vehicles with the aid of sensors and indicators that
predict needs for maintenance, and we are trying to establish the
fact that computers necessarily must play a central role in
maintenance diagnosis and prognosis. A third silver-bullet area is
Software Technology -- an all-out effort to solve DoD's software
problem(s). (This is an IPTO area, and we are working hard to formulate
it. George wants to get the Services and the software houses
into the effort, as do I, since I have embraced the basic goal of this
and see the Services and the companies that do DoD's software work
as essentially the targets (and we need to have the targets working with
and for us). An issue in ST is the degree to which AP can be kept in
the program as the main hope of achieving a really fundamental solution.
An important staffer on an important Congressional Committee seems
(still) to be set against AP and even against ST, and all the other
powers that be seem to be constitutionally against anything that won't
get finished while they are still in their present jobs.
At present, George's list of important things IPTO can do for
DoD is:
Get computers to read Morse Code in the presence of other code
and noise.
Get computers to identify/detect key words in a stream of
speech.
Develop speech-understanding systems (if there really is a
clear use for them in the military). [This is a major come-about
during the last few days. Earlier, he was very cool toward SUS.]
Solve DoD's 'Software Problem'.
Make a real contribution to Command and Control. [George is
not fully convinced about packet communications, yet, but he thinks
we may have something in there somewhere.]
Help the Tactical Technology Office do a good thing
in sonar.
[end of list]
Sadly, that list does not include some of the main items
that are on mine. It is too late on Easter evening to give my
full list, but here is one item from each of our seven
programs:
Intelligent Systems
Develop a system that will guide not-sufficiently-
trained maintenance men through the maintenance of complex equipment.
Advanced Memory Technology
Learn how to handle very large, distributed, redundant
databases.
Image Understanding
Develop automatic photointerpretation.
Climate Dynamics
Develop the basis in modeling and array computing for
evaluation of effects of major human projects/activities on climate.
[As you know, ARPA is transferring this
one to NSF -- but what I listed is more or less accomplished.]
Software Technology
Take the excessive cost, delay, and error out of software
development and maintenance.
Speech Processing
Make it possible for people to communicate with computers in
natural, continuous speech.
[Let me list a second item here.]
Achieve good-quality, natural, recognizable speech with
500 to 3000 bits per second (through commpression) so it can be
made secure for DoD communication -- and also master the handling of
speech in packet communication networks.
Integrated C↑3 Systems
Provide an integrated, coherent, secure, effective computer-
communication base of Command and Control -- i.e., an ARPANET-like
system with additional media (satellites, ground radio,
aircraft radio), security, message services, database services, and so
on, with the emphasis on integration/coherence.
[end of list]
What are we going to do about all this? Here in IPTO we are
going to continue our interaction with George and get off to a strong
start with the new Deputy Director who will be coming on board in a
couple of weeks. We are going to try to sell them our view of the
world, but we are going to be moving closer to their view, surely,
in the process. We will be pressing on you in ways not natural to
my philosophy -- not to get you to do research you do not want to do
or to make compromises you do not want to make, but to get you to see
the picture clearly as it is seen from here so you can make wise and
correct decisions. And we will be asking you, as soon as we can
arrange it, to come in and meet and try to influence the new Director
and Deputy Director. Meanwhile, we are open to advice and counsel --
indeed, need it and will appreciate it greatly.
On the positive side, let me say that a lot of the offices in
DoD and elswhere in the government have by now heard of IPTO and
are impppressed with the technology the IPTO Community
has created. There is some real support out there in the technical
offices of DoD. Also on the positive side, let me say that the IPTO
Program Managers have been doing a marvelous job. Their performance
on the second day of the Apportionment Review was superb, and George
Heilmeier realized he had really been in a session (and he acknowledged
it).
On the negative side, the fact is that we are not making as much
progress as I think necessary, and the timing in relation to my own
plans is very poor. As most of you know, I have been thinking
in terms of going back to MIT in September, and, unless, I can
get a strong candidate-successor before the new Director,
I am afraid he might take the occasion of my leaving to put
a strongly applications-oriented person into the job.
My reporting on the problem at this time is not intended to
sound a general quarters alarm; it is to make sure that you are aware
that a serious problem exists in ARPA-IPTO and demands profound
consideration by all of you. Please share this information with those
in your organizations who should ponder the matter and will respect its
sensitivity, and please call me to discuss any or all aspects of it.
I'll keep you informed as the situation develops.
[Time Lapse. Now it is Tuesday Morning.]
Yesterday afternoon, Dave Russell and I spent another hour
and a half with Heilmeier and Tachmindji. As a result, my perception
of the situation is a bit more definite. I'll add a few paragraphs
to Sunday's message (which I decided to hold until after the Monday
meeting) and send it off to you.
The 'directoral guidance' re Intelligent Systems is
now quite specific in these respects: ARPA does not want to continue
to fund the field in an open-ended stream-of-research way; it
wants to redirect most of the AI research it is funding in such a way
as to test or measure the present capability of the field to
serve real DoD application needs, and it would like to see the support
of basic research in AI either taken over by an agency such as NSF
or, at least, shared more equitably than it is now. The transition
will be handled insofar as possible to avoid damage to the field, but
the transition will be made. In some instances, contracts in the
IS area, or largely in the IS area, will be extended on a short-term
(e.g., 6 mo.) basis while redirection takes place.
Dave and I are directed to discuss with other agencies the assumption,
on their part, of a larger share of the over-all support of the
field. For the time being, the over-all IPTO IS budget is not to be
reduced, but it is necessary that the same funding level now cover
some application efforts. Definite allocations of funds within the
IS budget have not been directed, but it is clear that George is
determined to bring about the shift to application and will direct
definite allocations if he is not satisfied with IPTO's progress in
effecting the desired change in direction.
The Intelligent Terminals sub-area of IS, which is a new
sub-area, planned to be funded in FY 76, is not touched by the
direction just mentioned, and its funds are not part of the basic-
plus-applied total that is supposed to be the same in FY 76 as in FY 75.
The IT program has been planned in such a way that its application and
technology-transfer aspects are clear and definite, so it does not
come under the pressure to shift from basic to applied.
In Image Understanding, the direction is less definite, but the
pressure is strong to achieve actual applications of results in
image coding, image enhancement, and image restoration, and the
sense is that IPTO will have to determine and make the case for the
plausibility of a program in image interpretation (alias, extraction
of information from images, alias 'image understanding' in analogy
with 'speech understanding') before actually setting out on an
Image Understanding program. Again, the cost of application and
technology-transfer work will have to come out of a total budget that
is not greater than last year's.
The third basic-research area (the third of the three
IPTO Computer and Communication Sciences subelements) is Advanced
Memory Technology. It is almost wholly new in FY 76 and so does not
come under the same kind of redirectional pressure as IS and IU. The
Very Large Database Systems part of AMT is set up with strong attention
to application and technology transfer. The Advanced Memory Concepts
part has been planned as a quite-far-out program and therefore will
have philosophical problems that may translate themselves into
funding problems, but it is too early to tell just what will happen.
The AMC Program Planning Committee (Berlekamp Commitee) is going
to brief Heilmeier and others on (tentatively) April 17, and the
situation will begin to clarify itself then.
Finally (in this report of what I learned yesterday and how
it shaped my perception of what is going on), the feedback from our
Apportionment Review is going to slip a bit, and I will not know today
(as I think I indicated I would) exactly what the 'reapportionment
guidance' is.
From what I have said, you can see clearly, I think, that
we are at a watershed in the history of ARPA-IPTO. Although the
redirection is not wholly, or even to any large extent, in accord with
my own philosophy of research support, it will at least remove or
reduce the dissonance that has long characterized
the relation of the IPTO program to the DoD organizations that are
supposed to use the results of IPTO-supported R&D. At the same time,
it will introduce dissonance into the relation between IPTO and its
basic-research contractors. I am deeply concerned about my own role
in the redirection -- whether to fight it, try to contain it, or
join it wholeheartedly and try to steer it in such a way as to
wind up with a larger, stronger, more productive enterprise. I
have been about half way between the first two alternatives, but
neither the half-way-between point nor either of the first two is
really a workable position within ARPA. It has to be either leave
and fight or stay and join -- and it is clear that to adopt the former
course precipitously would have a very bad effect on the program.
And it is such an important -- in many ways, absolutely crucial --
program!
One of the next steps is to get the IS PIs to come here to talk
with George Heilmeier and Don Looft (who is the new Deputy Director,
just now coming on board). I'll be contacting some of you about that
in the near future.
Meanwhile, please let me hear from you. I need your counsel
and help.
[Another time lapse. Now it is Wednesday morning.]
Let me end this message with a proposal: what the response of
IPTO and the contractor community should be to the situation I have
described. I am sure the situation is real. I am not just in a
temporarily gloomy state. I have smoothed quite a bit, held back on
composing such a piece as this for some time, not wanting to be an
alarmist. Indeed, I would much rather talk with each of you
personally about the situation -- face to face or on the phone, so I
could react to your individual responses in real time. (I realize
that the written word is no proper medium for this kind of
communication, but there is not time for so many individual
interactions, and I think I should get on with this.) Here is
the proposal to which I invite your reaction:
IPTO should proceed promptly but deliberatlyy to construct
a new modus operandi that will provide a new basis for very significant
advances in computer and communications sciences, together with their
application to improve U.S. defense, during the next ten years.
The new game will wholeheartedly embrace the goal of bringing about
applications of new technology. It will continue the present
devotion to major scientific and technological advances (and not
devote much time or money to merely incremental improvements), but it
will devote a much larger fraction of its resources to moving the
advances into use. It will not, over a long period, be a zero-sum game.
(For a time, until it proves itself, it will have to operate with a
level or declining budget.) It will take
advantage of every demonstrated success to increase both the basic
research and the application budgets. But most of the growth will be in
the area of present lack, in computer and communication engineering and
applications, and there will be a significant shift in the center of
gravity of the contractor community. The shift will give the
university research groups an engineering arm , a marketplace,
customers, users. Several 'industrial' contractors and several
Service laboratories will be brought into the community, and maybe
one or two more of the FCRCs. (The Lincoln Laboratory is the only
'Federally Controlled Research Center' in the IPTO contractor
community in a major way.) Interaction
between the university research groups and the engineering and
application parts of the community will be real and strong. The
university people will learn more about possible DoD applications,
and there will be less basis for the belief (which exists in some
quarters) that there is an active shunning of research vehicles
that might appear to be related to DoD applications.
The interaction will strengthen the basic work because there
will be more feeback from real tests of the new ideas and because
every star needs an audience and performs best before a big and
enthusiastic one. Moreover, ideas will really start to move into
use. The presently vast gulf between how software is created in
some of the IPTO-sponsored laboratories and how it is created
in the shops that produce DoD's software will narrow. It will take
three years instead of thirty for spaghetti stacks
to get from LISP to COBOL.
In short, IPTO should correct the present imbalance, should
build up an engineering and applications wing to make the contractor
community strong and capable of meeting the challenges that are not
now being met well. This will remove the dissonance that is causing
the present trouble and will turn grumbling into appreciation. In the
process, it will do a very good thing for the basic science, which
cannot really get along playing so much to itself as it now
(allegedly and probably actually) is.
That is just a rough first cut and deals with objectives more
than with how to achieve them, but it seems best to propose
something for discussion rather than just to ask you to ponder
the situation. Please let me have your reactions soon.
Regards
Lick
-------